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JUDICIAL REMEDIES-LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT-The
United States Supreme Court held that collective bargaining
agreements, silent as to judicial remedies, cannot be construed to
divest the courts of jurisdiction under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act.
Groves v Ring Screw Works, - US -, 111 S Ct 498 (1990).
In 1987, the petitioners, Arthur Groves and Bobby J. Evans,
were discharged by their employer, Ring Screw Works (hereinafter
"Ring Screw").1 Groves was dismissed for alleged excessive, unex-
cused absences despite his contentions that the absences were for
legitimate medical reasons.2 Evans was terminated for alleged falsi-
fication of company records.s Subsequent to their dismissals,
Groves and Evans, joined by the petitioner union, invoked the
grievance procedures outlined in the two collective bargaining
agreements (hereinafter "CBAs") 5 which were in effect between
the union and respondent Ring Screw.6 Both CBAs prohibited the
termination of employees without "just cause" and provided for a
voluntary, four-step grievance procedure which reserved both par-
1. Groves v Ring Screw Works, - US -, 111 S Ct 498, 501 (1990).
2. Groves v Ring Screw Works, No 88-CV-2988, (ED Mich, April 5, 1988). The dis-
trict court's orders granting Ring Screw's Motions for Summary Judgement were unre-
ported, but reproduced in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at App 16a-29a, Groves v Ring
Screw Works, 882 F2d 1081 (6th Cir 1989) (No 88-CV-2988). Id.
3. Groves, 111 S Ct at 501, n.5.
4. Id at 500. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (hereinafter "UAW"), Local #771, was one of the three
petitioners and served as collective-bargaining agent for the two employee petitioners. Id at
500, n.2.
5. Id. "Collective bargaining" in labor law is the negotiation of employment matters
between employers and employees through the use of a bargaining agent designated by an
uncoerced majority of the employees within the bargaining unit. Joseph Alton Jenkins, 1
Labor Law § 9.114 (W. H. Anderson Co., 1969). "Collective bargaining agreement is the
contract negotiated between an employer and the employees' bargaining agent, generally a
labor union, which regulates terms and conditions of employment." Black's Law Dictionary
239 (West, 5th ed 1979).
6. Groves, 111 S Ct at 500-01. At the time of the discharges, Ring Screw and the
union were parties to two collective bargaining agreements, one covering Groves and another
covering Evans. Id at 500. The Court, in deciding Groves, treated the CBAs as one agree-
ment between the union and Ring Screw because "[t]he two agreements are almost identi-
cal," and "[a]t no stage of the litigation was there any claim that the two CBAs require
different interpretations." Id.
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ties' right to resort to economic weapons 7 in the event full exercise
of the grievance procedures failed to resolve the dispute.8 Critical
to the issue in Groves, both CBAs were silent as to judicial
remedies.9
Application of the grievance machinery did not result in the re-
instatement of Groves or Evans.' 0 At the conclusion of the proce-
dures, Ring Screw refused to rehire the petitioners and declined
the union's offer for binding arbitration. In response, however, the
union chose not to exercise its right to strike." Instead, the peti-
tioners, each joined by their union, filed civil actions in state court,
citing their rights under section 301 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act (hereinafter "LMRA").' 2 Asserting wrongful discharge,
7. Id at 502. The Court refers to "economic warfare" by means of strike, lockout or
similar work stoppage or interference. Id.
8. Id at 500. Both CBAs required that parties make "an earnest effort" to settle
every dispute that may arise under the agreement, but neither mandated arbitration. Id.
Grievance procedures were:
Section 1. Should a difference arise between the Company and the Union or its mem-
bers employed by the Company, as to the meaning and application of the provisions
of the agreement, an earnest effort will be made to settle it as follows:
Step 1. Between the employee, his steward and the foreman of his department. If a
satisfactory settlement is not reached, then
Step 2. Between the Shop Committee, with or without the employee, and the Com-
pany management. If a satisfactory settlement is not reached, then
Step 3. The Shop Committee and/or the Company may call the local Union president
and/or the International representative to arrange a meeting in an attempt to resolve
the grievance. If a satisfactory settlement is not reached, then
Step 4. The Shop Committee and the Company may call in an outside representative
to assist in settling the difficulty. This may include arbitration by mutual agreement
in discharge cases only.
Id at 500 n.3.
Parties, under both CBAs, were required to exhaust a multi-step grievance procedure prior
to taking economic measures. Id at 500. In addition, "[u]nresolved grievances (except arbi-
tration decisions) shall be handled as set forth in Article XVI, section 7[,]" which stated:
The Union will not cause or permit its members to cause, nor will any member of the
Union take part in any strike ... or other interference ... during the terms of this
agreement until all negotiations have failed through the grievance procedure set forth
herein. Neither will the Company engage in any lockout until the same grievance
procedure has been carried out.
Id at 501 n.4.
9. Id at 500.
10. Id at 501 n.6. There was no dispute that the grievance procedures were properly
followed and that the union fairly represented the petitioners. Id.
11. Id at 501 n.7. In the Evans case, at the conclusion of the grievance procedures, a
strike vote was authorized and taken by the unit members at the plant at which he worked,
but the issue did not receive the required two-thirds majority. Id. In the Groves case, at the
conclusion of the grievance procedures, representatives of Local 771 met and determined a
strike vote should not be authorized. Id.
12. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (hereinafter "the LMRA"),
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both petitioners claimed Ring Screw violated the "just cause" pro-
visions of their respective CBAs.' 3
Ring Screw subsequently removed both cases to federal district
court,14 responding to the complaints with successful Motions for
Summary Judgement.15 First, in the case of Groves, the district
court agreed with Ring Screw's argument that the petitioners had
no cause of action under section 301 of the LMRA because the
union had negotiated a mechanism for final dispute resolution in
the CBA, namely the right to strike.'" The court stated that to rule
otherwise would not only circumvent the presumed contractual in-
tent of the parties, but would have the effect of nullifying, in part,
the bargaining process engaged in by both parties.' 7 Less than two
months later, with consistent reasoning, the district court followed
suit in its disposition of the Evans case.""
also known as the Taft-Hartley Act, Pub L No 101, 61 Stat 156 (1947), codified at 29 USC §
185 (1982). Section 301 of the LMRA provided a means for the individual employee to judi-
cially enforce the provisions of a CBA against his employer. Smith v Evening News Ass'n,
371 US 195, 199-201 (1962).
13. Groves, 882 F2d 1081. A contract provision prohibiting dismissal without "just
cause" requires "[a] cause outside legal cause, which must be based on reasonable grounds,
and there must be a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith ... [flair,
adequate, reasonable cause". Black's Law Dictionary 775 (West 5th ed 1979).
14. Groves, 882 F2d at 1082. Here, Ring Screw was a defendant in a civil action
brought in a state court in which the complaints alleged a violation of federal labor law. Id.
The Judicial Code allows for the removal of matters to which the courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction to the federal district court which geographically encom-
passes the place where the action is pending. 28 USC § 1441 (1988). Both cases were re-
moved to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern
Division. Groves, 882 F2d at 1082.
15. Id. FRCP 56 permits any party to a civil action to move for summary judgment
on a claim when he believes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is
entitled to prevail as a matter of law. FRCP 56.
16. Groves, No 88-CV-2988 (ED Mich, April 5, 1988). Reproduced in Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari at App 16a-29a, Groves, 882 F2d 1081. Pursuant to FRCP 56, Ring Screw
filed a Motion for Summary Judgement to which Groves fied pleadings in opposition. Id.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division,
granted the defendant's motion which asserted, "Groves may not obtain a judicial remedy
for his alleged wrongful discharge because he has not claimed his union breached its duty of
fair representation and cannot upset the finality of his contractual grievance procedure." Id.
See also note 2.
See notes 21, 70, 71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases focusing on a
requisite union violation of its duty of fair representation in order to establish a cause of
action under section 301 of the LMRA.
17. Id.
18. Evans v Ring Screw Works, No 88-CV-72989, (ED Mich, May 23, 1988). Repro-
duced in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at App 16a-29a, Groves, 882 F2d 1081. In a bench
opinion granting Ring Screw's Motion for Summary Judgment, the court stated that "the
grievance procedure has terminated, as it was negotiated to do, with the strike vote ...
[and] the court must presume that the members 6f this unit got something else instead of
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The two cases were consolidated on appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit."9 In review of the district
court's dismissal of the petitioners' claims under section 301 of the
LMRA, the issue the court considered was whether the negotiated
grievance procedures contained in the CBAs offered the exclusive
means of dispute resolution when the agreements were silent as to
judicial remedies.20 To decide affirmatively would preclude Groves
and Evans from bringing an action for breach of contract against
Ring Screw without an allegation that the union breached its duty
of fair representation. 21 The court, cognizant of conflicts in the cir-
cuits, 22 expressed reservations regarding the "presumption"23 that
the lack of language permitting judicial recourse was evidence of
negotiated finality barring any judicial review. 24 Nevertheless,
bound by precedent,2 5 the court affirmed the district court's deci-
final and binding arbitration when they negotiated the contract." Id (emphasis added).
19. Groves, 882 F2d 1081. The relevant facts were not disputed. Id at 1082.
20. Id.
21. Id. The union acts as the employee's agent in negotiating and administrating a
CBA and is thereby bound by the duty of fair representation. Humphrey v Moore, 373 US
335 (1964). Because the union alone is empowered under the CBA to represent the employee
during grievance proceedings, the employee can seek judicial enforcement of the CBA under
§ 301 of the LMRA only if the union wrongfully represents his interests under the agree-
ment. Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171 (1967). Humphrey and Vaca will be discussed subsequently
in greater detail.
22. Groves, 882 F2d at 1085. The court cited Dickeson v DAW Forest Prods. Co., 827
F2d 627 (9th Cir 1987), as being contrary to Fortune v National Twist Drill and Tool Div.,
684 F2d 374 (6th Cir 1982), which was the controlling precedent in the Sixth Circuit.
Groves, 882 F2d at 1085. In Dickeson, the Ninth Circuit refused to conclude that CBAs,
silent as to judicial remedies, evidenced a negotiated forfeiture of rights to judicial review.
Dickeson, 827 F2d at 629. The Sixth Circuit, in Fortune, presumed the opposite. Fortune,
684 F2d at 375. Also see notes 84 through 88 and 101 through 103 and accompanying text.
23. Groves, 882 F2d at 1085, 1086. See notes 16 through 18 and accompanying text
summarizing the district court's reasoning that the right to strike was presumed to be bar-
gained for by the union in its negotiation of the grievance procedures set forth in the CBAs.
For additional discussion concerning the precedent for the "bargained for" presumption, see
Amanda J. Berlowe, Judicial Deference to Grievance Arbitration in the Private Sector:
Saving Grace in the Search for a Well Defined Public Policy Exception, 42 U Miami L Rev
767, 773 (1988).
24. Groves, 882 F2d at 1086.
Were we deciding the issue with a clean slate, we might be disposed to adopt the
rationale of Dickeson .... While we may question the wisdom of foreclosing judicial
review of contracts which fail to provide for either 'final' or 'binding' peaceful resolu-
tion via arbitration, since the absence of such a provision cannot be taken to infer
that the union (and thereby its employees) gained anything in its contract negotia-
tions as a result, it is nevertheless well established in this circuit that a panel of this
court is bound by the prior decisions of another panel of the same issue.
Id (emphasis added). See also note 27.
25. Fortune, 684 F2d 374 (6th Cir 1982). The Sixth Circuit in Fortune held that the
employee, unless able to prove bad faith representation by his collective bargaining agent,
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sion noting that even a liberal reading of section 30126 does not
extend the parties' rights to remedies beyond those negotiated in
the CBA.27
Encouraged by the court's reluctance to affirm the district
court's decision, Groves, Evans and the union petition d the Sixth
Circuit for a rehearing en banc. 2s Upon denial, the petitioners filed
a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.
29
To resolve the conflict in the circuits, the Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari.30 After assessing whether CBAs
that are silent as to judicial remedies should be construed, after
grievance procedures fail, to bar recourse to the courts under sec-
tion 301 of the LMRA, the Court reversed and remanded the deci-
was limited exclusively to the grievance mechanism negotiated in the CBA. If such proce-
dures did not prescribe for the arbitration of deadlocked disputes, no federal law conveyed
the power to the courts to so provide. Id at 375. See also note 28 for reference to Sixth
Circuit precedents.
26. The court of appeals cited Smith, 371 US at 199, noting section 301 of the LMRA
"is not to be given a narrow reading." Groves, 882 F2d at 1084.
27. Id. The court of appeals cited the following line of cases in which the courts have
consistently favored the resolution of labor disputes through arbitration so long as the CBA
so provides: United Steelworkers of Am. v American Mfg. Co., 363 US 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 US 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v
Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 US 593 (1960). Groves, 882 F2d at 1084. These cases
will be discussed more fully in the body of this note.
28. Groves, 882 F2d at 1086. The petitioners were responding to the court's state-
ment, "The only means to reexamine this policy would be by en banc consideration of the
Fortune holding and rationale." Id at 1087. Here, en banc refers to consideration by the
entire membership of the court, or a number sufficient for a quorum, rather than the usual
panel of judges that preside over circuit courts of appeal. FRAP 35. In its opinion, the court
cited the following Sixth Circuit decisions which had previously applied the Fortune ration-
ale: Mochko v Acme-Cleveland Corp., 826 F2d 1064 (6th Cir 1987); Agate v General Motors
Corp., 798 F2d 1413 (6th Cir 1986); United Furniture Workers v National Bedding, 718
F2d 1101 (6th Cir 1983). Groves, 882 F2d at 1086. All of the aforementioned cases were
unpublished per curiam decisions of the Sixth Circuit. Id. Finally, per curiam is a phrase
used to distinguish an opinion of the whole court from an opinion written by any one judge.
Black's Law Dictionary 1023 (West, 5th ed 1979).
29. Groves v Ring Screw Works, 1989 US App LEXIS 16633, *1 (6th Cir). The peti-
tion for rehearing was circulated not only to the original panel members but also to all other
active judges of the Sixth Circuit. Id. No judge requested a vote on the suggestion of rehear-
ing and the original panel, to which the petition was referred, concluded that the issues
raised in the petition were fully considered in the original decision of the case. Id.
30. Groves v Ring Screw Works, - US _ 110 S Ct 1469 (1990). The Court lists the
following circuit cases of conflicting decisions (to be later discussed in detail): Fortune, 684
F2d 374 (6th Cir 1982); Haynes v United States Pipe and Foundry Co., 362 F2d 414 (5th
Cir 1966); Associated Gen. Contractors of Ill. v Illinois Conference of Teamsters, 486 F2d
972 (7th Cir 1973); Dickeson, 827 F2d 627 (9th Cir 1987); United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 376 F2d 731 (10th Cir 1967).
Groves, 111 S Ct at 500.
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sion of the Sixth Circuit.31
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens acknowledged
that section 301 of the LMRA had been interpreted to promote
judicial enforcement of CBAs in order to reflect the interest of
Congress in placing a "higher degree of responsibility on the nego-
tiating parties to such agreements." 2 Conceding Ring Screw was
correct in its argument that the judicial forum can be precluded if
the parties agree to other methods of dispute resolution, the Court
concluded, however, that aggregate federal policies resulted in a
stronger presumption favoring access to a neutral forum for the
peaceful resolution of labor disputes.3 3 To interpret otherwise, the
Court indicated, would cloud the merits of a dispute (here,
whether there was "just cause" for the discharge of Groves and
Evans) with the comparative strength of the opposing parties.3 4
The opinion preserved the right of parties to expressly bargain
away their rights to mediation, arbitration, or judicial review in ex-
change for their rights to resort to economic warfare.35 Because
such forfeitures conflict with federal legislation, 6 the Court instead
adopted the law promulgated in the Seventh Circuit decision Asso-
ciated Gen. Contractors of Ill. v Illinois Conference of Team-
sters,31 in which the same issues were presented. 8 The Seventh
Circuit opinion honored the rights of parties to negotiate final pro-
cedures for the settlement of disputes. However, in the absence of
express language forbidding judicial participation in the resolution
of important disputes or language compelling the parties to use
force instead of reason to resolve their differences, the court de-
clined to construe the CBA as requiring economic warfare as the
31. Groves, 111 S Ct at 500, 501 n.8. The Court concluded, "[g]iven the expressed
doubt about the correctness of the Circuit precedent that it was following, together with the
fact that there was a square conflict in the Circuits, it might have been appropriate for the
panel to request a rehearing en banc." Id.
32. Id at 502, citing S Rep No 105, 80th Cong, 1st Sess 17 (1947). See also note 42
and accompanying text.
33. Groves, 111 S Ct at 502. Respondent argued § 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act
which declares the CBA procedures negotiated as the desirable method for settling labor
disputes (see also note 58 and accompanying text). Id. The Court countered by referencing
unfair labor practices suits under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, as
well as actions brought before the judiciary under § 301 of the LMRA, as stronger indicia of
national labor policies in favor of peaceful dispute resolution. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id at 503. "Such a method is the antithesis of the peaceful methods of dispute
resolution envisaged by Congress when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act." Id.
37. 486 F2d 972 (1973).
38. Groves, 111 S Ct at 503.
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exclusive or desirable method" for settling deadlocked
grievances.40
In adopting the view of the Seventh Circuit, the Court made a
final note to clarify that CBAs which were silent as to judicial rem-
edies would not be construed against either party, union or em-
ployer, to divest the courts of jurisdiction under section 301 of the
LMRA.41
The 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act were
enacted to augment the traditional means of mediating labor dis-
putes and to encourage responsible negotiation of collective bar-
gaining contracts by both employer and union.42 The amendments,
known as the LMRA,4 3 relay policy underpinnings designed to
"provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the inter-
ference by either with the legitimate rights of the other... ," and
to "encourag[e] practice fundamental to the friendly adjustment of
industrial disputes arising out of differences. . . ."' To such ends,
section 301 of the LMRA41 conferred a federal venue for suits, by
39. Id. "Desirable method" for settlement of grievance disputes involves Ring Screw's
interpretation of section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act which will be discussed subse-
quently in the text.
40. Id, citing Associated Gen. Contractors of IMI., 486 F2d 972 (1973).
41. Groves, 111 S Ct at 503.
42. LMRA, 61 Stat 136 (1947). Pub L 101, HR 3020, 80th Cong, 1st Sess (June 23,
1947). See also S Rep No 105, 80th Cong, 1st Sess 17 (1947).
43. LMRA § 1(a), 61 Stat 136 (1947). Pub L 101, HR 3020, 80th Cong, 1st Sess (June
23, 1947).
44. LMRA § 1(b), 61 Stat 136 (1947). Pub L 101, HR 3020, 80th Cong, 1st Sess (June
23, 1947).
45. LMRA, Title I, § 101, 61 Stat 137 (1947). Pub L 101, HR 3020, 80th Cong, 1st
Sess (June 23, 1947).
46. LMRA, Title III, § 301, 61 Stat 156 (1947), codified at 29 USC § 185. Suits by
and against Labor Organizations reads:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined in this Chapter and any employer whose activities affect commerce
as defined in this Chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor
organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it
represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor
organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against
the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable
against any individual member of his assets.
(c) For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against labor organizations in
the district courts of the United States, district courts shall be deemed to have juris-
diction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains
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and against labor unions, for violation of CBAs regardless of the
amount of the controversy or the citizenship of the litigants. 47 Fur-
thermore, the LMRA rendered inapplicable a provision in the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act4" which stated that in such suits, no employer or
labor organization participating or interested in a labor dispute
could be held responsible for the unlawful acts of their agents
without clear proof of authorization or ratification with prior
knowledge.49
Section 301 inspired considerable litigation among the circuit
courts, frequently with inconsistent results. Early decisions were at
odds as to whether section 301 created substantive rights in the
litigants50 or merely granted federal district courts jurisdiction. 1
The United States Supreme Court subsequently offered guid-
ance in 1957 with Textile Workers Union of Am. v Lincoln Mills
of Ala.,52 in which the Court affirmed a Fifth Circuit decree for
its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents
are engaged in representing or acting for employee members.
(d) The service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of any court of the
United States upon an officer or agent of a labor organization, in his capacity as such,
shall constitute service upon the labor organization.
(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting as an
"agent" of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts,
the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subse-
quently ratified shall not be controlling.
Id.
47. LMRA § 301(a), 61 Stat 157 (1947), codified at 29 USC § 185 (1947).
48. HR Rep No 510, 80th Cong, 1st Sess (1947). The Norris-LaGuardia Act defines
the jurisdiction and authority of federal courts in matters affecting employer and employee.
29 USC § 102 (1991).
49. LMRA § 301(e), 61 Stat 157 (1947), codified at 29 USC § 185 (1947).
50. Shirley-Herman Co. v International Hod Carriers Laborers Union, 182 F2d 806,
809 (2d Cir 1950); Rock Drilling Union v Mason & Hanger Co., 217 F2d 687, 691-92 (2d Cir
1954); Signal-Stat Corp. v Local 475, 235 F2d 298, 300 (2d Cir 1956); Association of West-
inghouse Employees v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F2d 623, 625 (3d Cir 1954), aff'd on
other grounds, 348 US 437; Textile Workers Union v Arista Mills, 193 F2d 529, 533 (4th Cir
1951); Hamilton Foundry v International Molders & Foundry Union, 193 F2d 209, 215 (6th
Cir 1952); American Federation of Labor v Western Union, 179 F2d 535 (6th Cir 1950);
Milk & Ice Cream Drivers v Gillespie Milk Prod. Corp., 203 F2d 650, 651 (6th Cir 1953);
United Electrical R & M Workers v Oliver Corp., 205 F2d 376, 384-85 (8th Cir 1953);
Schatte v International Alliance, 182 F2d 158, 164 (9th Cir 1950), as cited in Textile Work-
ers Union of Am. v Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 US 448, 501 (1957).
51. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v Jay-Ann Co., 228 F2d 632 (5th
Cir 1956); Mercury Oil Refining Co. v Oil Workers Union, 187 F2d 980, 983 (10th Cir 1951),
as cited in Textile Workers Union of Am., 353 US at 450.
52. 353 US 448 (1957). In Textile Workers Union of Am., the CBA provided for arbi-
tration at the conclusion of grievance procedures in lieu of strikes or work stoppages. Tex-
tile Workers Union of Am., 353 US at 449. The dispute at issue concerned work loads and
work assignments. Id. When the union's demands were finally denied by the employer, the
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specific performance against an employer. Ordering arbitration of a
labor dispute as negotiated in the CBA. Section 301(a) was specifi-
cally interpreted to confer power to the federal courts "to fashion a
body of federal common law" from the national labor laws53 to en-
force the terms of the CBA.54
Less than three years later, in a trio of cases decided on the
same day, the Court refined its construction of the powers con-
veyed to the federal courts by section 301." In the first of the
"Steelworkers Trilogy", United Steelworkers of Am. v American
Mfg. Co.,56 the Court limited the function of the judiciary under
section 301 to ascertaining whether the remedy sought by the
claimant was governed by the CBA.5 The Court held that section
301 did not extend to judicial examination of the merits of the
grievance or the equity of the dispute. 58 Next, with an emphasis on
union, exercising the procedures outlined in the CBA, called for arbitration. Id. The em-
ployer refused and, in response, the union sued in federal district court to compel arbitra-
tion. Id.
53. Id at 456. The Textile Workers Union of Am.'s construction of § 301 as a con-
gressional mandate to the federal courts to create a body of federal common law to address
labor disputes has, over the years, generated pre-emption issues that were not raised in
Groves v Ring Screw Works. Groves, 111 S Ct 498. Authoritative cases dealing with pre-
emptive effects of § 301 include: Local 174, Teamsters v Lucas Flour Co., 369 US 95, 103
(1962); Smith, 371 US at 197-201; Charles Dowd Box Co. v Courtney, 368 US 502, 506-14
(1962); Republic Steel Corp. v Maddox, 379 US 650, 657 (1965); Bowen v United States
Postal Serv., 459 US 212, 224-25 (1983); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v Lueck, 471 US 202, 208-21
(1985); Lingle v Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 US 399, 403-13 (1988).
54. Textile Workers Union of Am., 353 US at 455. Plainly the agreement to arbitrate
grievance disputes is the 'quid pro quo' for the agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light,
the legislation (§ 301 of the LMRA) does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts
over labor organizations. It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce
these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can
be best obtained only in that way. Id.
55. For a discussion of these kindred opinions, commonly known as the "Steelwork-
ers Trilogy," and the restrictions they imposed to instill judicial deference to the CBA and
arbitrators decision, see Berlowe, 42 U Miami L Rev at 767 (cited in note 23).
56. 363 US 564 (1960). American Mfg. Co. involved a CBA which provided for the
arbitration of all disputes, and a "no-strike" provision contingent on the employer's accept-
ance of the decision of the arbitrator. American Mfg. Co., 363 US at 565. The dispute in-
volved an employee who accepted a disability settlement, then sought reinstatement to his
job by virtue of the seniority provisions of the CBA. Id at 566. The Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision to grant summary judgment because the evidence disclosed the
grievance to be "frivolous, patently baseless ... [and] not subject to arbitration under the
collective bargaining agreement." Id. The Supreme Court, critical of the appellate court's
evaluation of the merits of the dispute, reversed. Id at 569.
57. Id at 568. The CBA required the submission of all grievances, including those
concerning the interpretation or application of the CBA, to arbitration. Id. Therefore,
whether the grievance could be supported by the language of the contract was a matter for
the arbitrator, not the Court, to decide. Id at 569.
58. Id at 566. The Court in American Mfg. Co. relied on § 203(d) of the LMRA which
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"quid pro quo" for negotiating away the right to strike,59 the Court
in United Steelworkers of Am. v Warrior and Gulf Navigation
Co.,e0 held that in the absence of any express language excluding a
particular dispute from arbitration, only the most "forceful evi-
dence" to deny arbitration under the CBA could prevail.61 Judicial
inquiry under section 301 was again restricted to whether the claim
was governed by the negotiated grievance procedures rather than
the merits of the dispute.6 2 Finally, in United Steelworkers of Am.
v Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.,e5 the Court went one step fur-
ther to hold that whether the results of arbitration were in fact
meritorious was not an appropriate issue under section 301 for the
614federal courts to review.
states, "[flinal [dispute] adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby de-
clared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the ap-
plication or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement[.]" LMRA §
203(d), 61 Stat 154 (1947), codified at 29 USC § 173(d) (1947) (emphasis added). In order to
effectuate the legislative policy, the Court concluded that the grievance procedures negoti-
ated by the parties for settlement of their differences under "the collective-bargaining
agreement must be given full play." American Mfg. Co., 363 US at 566 (emphasis added).
59. United Steelworkers of America v Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 US 574,
578 (1960), citing Textile Workers of Am. In discussing the "function of management" ex-
ception the Court noted that when an absolute no-strike clause is included in the CBA,
"quid pro quo" subjects virtually everything that management does to the agreement, unless
language expressly designates otherwise. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 US at 583-
84. See also Berlowe, 42 U Miami L Rev at 767 (cited in note 23), for a discussion of the
"quid pro quo" negotiations typical of collective bargaining process.
60. 363 US 574 (1960). The CBA in Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co. also contained
a "no-strike/no lockout" clause, and the prescribed grievance procedures culminated in arbi-
tration, except for matters which were strictly a "function of management," unless differ-
ences arose as to the meaning and application of the provisions of the CBA, or in the event
any local trouble should arise. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 US at 576. The dis-
pute involved employee layoffs while union work was contracted out to independent labor-
ers. Id at 575. At the unsuccessful conclusion of the grievance procedures the employer re-
fused arbitration. Id at 577. The lower court's decision affirming the dismissal of the
complaint based on the "function of management" exception to arbitration was reversed. Id
at 577, 585.
61. Id at 585. Also, the Court made note that a vague exclusion clause must bend in
the face of a sweeping arbitration clause. Id. "Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage
[by the CBA]." Id at 583.
62. Id, citing American Mfg. Co. See discussion at notes 56 through 58 and accompa-
nying text.
63. 363 US 593 (1960). In Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., a dispute over wrongful
discharge was submitted to arbitration in accordance with the CBA then in effect. Enter-
prise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 US at 595. The arbitrator subsequently made an award
determination, with which the district court ordered the respondent employer to comply. Id.
The Fourth Circuit subsequently reversed, holding that the awards were not enforceable. Id
at 596. The Supreme Court reversed, criticizing the appellate court's review of the arbitra-
tor's decision. Id at 599.
64. Id at 596. Mere ambiguity in the arbitrator's opinion was insufficient cause for
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Later, in 1962, even in the absence of a no-strike clause, the
Court held in Local 174, Teamsters v Lucas Flour Co.,e5 that a
strike to address grievances was a violation of a CBA which pro-
vided exclusively for compulsory, final and binding arbitration to
settle disputes."' The Court emphasized that federal labor policy
encouraged peaceful arbitration of grievances. 6 7 The Court simi-
larly promoted arbitration as a means of dispute resolution in
cases decided later that year.68 Also in 1962, the Court extended
coverage under section 301 to individual employees seeking judicial
redress for violations of a CBA. e
the lower court's refusal to enforce the award. Id at 598. "It is the arbitrator's construction
[of the CBA] that was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns the
construction of the CBA, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpre-
tation of the CBA is different from his." Id at 599.
65. 369 US 95 (1962). For a discussion of implied versus express no-strike clauses and
the impact of each on whether a labor dispute can be arbitrated, see analysis of Lucas Flour
Co. in Andrew M. Short, Express No-Strike Clauses and the Requirement of Clear and
Unmistakable Waiver: A Short Analysis, 70 Cornell L Rev 272, 273 (1985).
66. Lucas Flour Co., 369 US 95 (1962). In Lucas Flour Co., the CBA called for bind-
ing arbitration for the settlement of all disputes. Id at 96. The grievance involved the dis-
charge of an employee, to which the union responded with an eight day strike calling for
reinstatement. Id at 97. The employer sought and obtained damages for business losses
caused by the strike. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the award to the employer. Id at 106.
67. Id at 105. "[T]he basic policy of national labor legislation [is] to promote the
arbitral process as a substitute for economic warfare." Id, referring to Warrior and Gulf
Navigation Co.
68. Atkinson v Sinclair Refining Co., 370 US 238 (1962). "[W]hether or not the com-
pany was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be
determined by the court on the basis of the contract [CBA] entered into by the parties[.]"
Atkinson, 370 US at 241, citing Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co. and American Mfg. Co.
On the same day, however, the Court distinguished Drake Bakeries Inc. v Local 50,
American Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int'l, 370 US 254 (1962). Like Atkinson, the
employer in Drake Bakeries Inc. sued the union for damages caused by a strike in violation
of the CBA. Drake Bakeries Inc., 370 US at 256. The union in Drake Bakeries Inc., how-
ever, successfully contended that whether there actually was a one-day strike in violation of
the CBA was a dispute requiring arbitration under the contracted grievance procedures. Id
at 262-63. Finding that the CBA's arbitration procedures had not been exhausted, the Su-
preme Court enforced the employer's duty to arbitrate the consequences of the alleged one-
day strike, again referencing the enforcement duties assigned by § 301 as interpreted in the
"Steelworker Trilogy" precedents discussed in notes 55 through 64. Id at 263-66.
69. Smith, 371 US 195 (1962). ". ..congress has directed the courts to formulate and
apply federal law to suits for violations of collective-bargaining agreements. There is no
constitutional difficulty and § 301 is not to be given a narrow reading." Id at 199 (emphasis
added). The Court acknowledged that its decision in Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v Westinghouse Corp., 348 US 437 (1955), denying federal jurisdiction under §
301 to enforce a single employee's rights, had not survived the "individual" nature of the
grievances addressed in Textile Workers Union of Am., Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.,
and Atkinson (pay rates, working hours, wrongful discharge, and back pay). Smith, 371 US
at 199-200.
Subsequeitly, in Truck Drivers Union v Riss & Co., 372 US 517 (1963), the Court re-
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Individual access to a federal jurisdiction under section 301 led
to the 1964 decision, Humphrey v Moore,70 in which the Court
ruled that, absent a breach of a union's duty of fair representa-
tion,71 the employee is bound by the results of proceedings be-
tween the union and his employer as authorized by the CBA. Fol-
lowing Humphrey, the Court, in Republic Steel Corp. v Maddox,
72
held that negotiated grievance procedures must be exhausted
before the judiciary can avail itself to the employee under section
301. To rule otherwise, reasoned the Court, would inhibit the abil-
ity of the employer and union to negotiate an effective method for
peaceful settlement of disputes and thereby circumvent national
labor policy.7 '3 In 1981, however, to resolve conflicts between the
circuits,74 the Court clarified the Republic Steel Corp. "exhaus-
versed and remanded the court of appeals' decision which relied heavily on Association of
Westinghouse Salaried Employees, repeating that the case was no longer authoritative as
precedent. Truck Drivers Union, 372 US at 518.
70. 375 US 335 (1964). The CBA in Humphrey provided for a joint employer-union
committee to settle certain disputes. Humphrey, 375 US at 336. The grievance was for
wrongful discharge based on the committee's determination of the relative seniority of the
claimants. Id at 337. The Court cited authorities establishing the union as the "exclusive
bargaining agent in the negotiation and administration of a collective bargaining contract
accompanied by ... the responsibility and duty of fair representation." Id at 342.
71. See Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171 (1967), in which the Court later elaborated that a
union does not breach its duty of fair representation merely because it settles a dispute
prior to final grievance procedures allowing arbitration as provided in the CBA. Vaca, 386
US at 191-92. Because the union has the sole power under the CBA to invoke the final
stages of the grievance procedures, the employee may seek judicial enforcement of the CBA
only if the union wrongfully refused to exhaust the methods for dispute resolution outlined
in the CBA. Id at 185.
Following Vaca and Republic Steel Corp. v Maddox, 379 US 650 (1965) (see note 72 and
accompanying text), in Hines v Anchor Motor Freight Inc., 424 US 554 (1976), the Court
held that when a union's breach of fair representation is established, the CBA mechanism is
tainted. Hines, 424 US at 561. Therefore, failure to fully engage the negotiated grievance
procedures, "express or implied," cannot be used to bar employee actions under § 301
against his employer. Id at 567-69.
72. 379 US 650 (1965). In Republic Steel Corp., the Court reversed judgment in favor
of a terminated employee who, rather than engage in the CBA procedures to obtain sever-
ance, successfully obtained relief from a state court. Republic Steel Corp., 379 US at 651.
73. Id at 653. "Congress has expressly approved contract grievance procedures as a
preferred method for settling disputes and stabilizing the 'common law' of the plant. LMRA
§ 203(d), 29 USC § 173(d); § 201(c), 29 USC § 171(c) (1958 ed)." Id. The opinion also cited
the principles of Textiles Workers Union of Am. Id at 655. See notes 52 through 54 and
accompanying text.
74. As cited in Clayton v UAW, 451 US 679 (1981). The following cases held that an
employee's failure to exhaust internal union appeals precluded a § 301 action against his
union or employer: Johnson v General Motors, 641 F2d 1075, 1083 (2d Cir 1981); Geddes v
Chrysler Corp., 608 F2d 261, 264 (6th Cir 1979); Petersen v Rath Packing Co., 461 F2d 312,
315 (8th Cir 1972); Retana v Apartment, Motel, Hotel and Elevator Operators Union, 453
F2d 1018, 1027 n.16. (9th Cir 1972). Clayton, 451 US at 684. Those circuits of the view that
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tion" requirement for a section 301 action filed by an employee
against his union and employer by distinguishing Clayton v Auto-
mobile Workers.76 In Clayton, the Court held that an employee's
exhaustion of the internal union appeals process was excused with
respect to both the suit against the employer and the suit against
his union, when such procedures could not reactivate the em-
ployee's grievance or obtain the complete relief sought by the em-
ployee in an action under section 301.6
The evolution of section 301 decisions has resulted in a relatively
recent conflict among the circuits. Whether the recitals of a CBA
provide the exclusive means for resolving labor disputes, and thus
preclude a section 301 cause of action when the CBA grievance
procedures are exhausted without reaching a settlement, has
caused considerable discord.7 As to the finality of the CBA griev-
ance procedures, decisions from the Fifth and Sixth Circuit courts
directly conflict with those of the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits regarding the availability of recourse under the LMRA. 78
The Fifth Circuit has consistently ruled in accordance with its
1966 opinion in Haynes v United States Pipe & Foundry Co.
7 9
exhaustion of the internal union appeals process is necessary if the procedures could reacti-
vate the grievance are: Varra v Dillon Co., 615 F2d 1315, 1317-18 (10th Cir 1980); Baldini v
Local Union No. 1095, 581 F2d 145, 150 (7th Cir 1978); Winter v Local Union No. 639, 569
F2d 146, 150-51 (DC Cir 1977); Harrison v Chrysler Corp., 558 F2d 1273, 1278 (7th Cir
1977). Clayton, 451 US at 685. Some circuits held that failure to exhaust is excused if union
officials would be prohibitively hostile: Fizer v Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F2d 182, 183-84
(10th Cir 1978); Winter v Local Union No. 639, 569 F2d 146, 150-51 (DC Cir 1977); Imel v
Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F2d 181, 184 (10th Cir 1973). Clayton, 451 US at 685. Circuits that
excused failure to exhaust if substantive relief afforded by the internal procedures is less
than that offered by a § 301 action against the union are: Tinsley v United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 635 F2d 1288, 1290 (7th Cir 1980); Geddes v Chrysler Corp., 608 F2d 261, 264 (6th Cir
1979); Baldini v Local Union No. 1095, 581 F2d 145, 149 (7th Cir 1978); Buzzard v Local
Lodge 1040, 480 F2d 35, 41 (9th Cir 1973). Clayton, 451 US at 685.
75. Clayton, 451 US at 687. The dispute in Clayton involved wrongful discharge. Id
at 682. The union proceeded according to the steps provided by the CBA, falling short of
calling for binding arbitration. Id. Because Clayton was notified of the union's refusal to
arbitrate after the call to arbitration deadline under the CBA had expired, he ignored the
UAW appellate procedures and sought relief against the union for breach of duty of fair
representation and against his employer for breach of the CBA. Id at 682-83.
76. Id at 685. In Clayton the court distinguished between the exhaustion of the inter-
nal union procedures and grievance procedures provided in a CBA. Id. The former, ex-
plained the Court, were not bargained for by the employer and union nor were they men-
tioned in the CBA. Id. The Court rejected the argument that UAW-created procedures were
consistent with the national labor policy and therefore should receive similar "full play"
prior to judicial interference. Id at 687-88.
77. Groves, 111 S Ct at 500. For a listing of conflicting cases, see note 30.
78. Groves, 111 S Ct at 500.
79. 362 F2d 414 (5th Cir 1966). Haynes, through his union, followed the grievance
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The court in Haynes denied an employee the right to bring an ac-
tion against his employer for wrongful discharge because the em-
ployee, through his union, had negotiated with his employer for
the resolution of such a dispute exclusively as outlined in the
CBA. 0 The court inquired whether, after the employee exhausted
the grievance procedures under the CBA, he could then contest
their finality in court if dissatisfied with the outcome. The answer
in Haynes was, in accordance with reigning authority, not without
a contention that the union breached its duty of faithful
representation.""
Even before Republic Steel Corp., the Sixth Circuit ruled with a
similar perspective in Union News Co. v Hildreth.12 In Hildreth,
the court concluded it was within the authority of the union to
concur with the employer as to the "just cause" discharge of the
employee. Such a decision by the union, absent bad faith bargain-
ing, barred the employee from seeking judicial review of its mer-
its. 3 Twenty years later, Fortune v National Twist Drill & Tool8 4
solidified the Sixth Circuit's position by aligning with the Fifth
Circuit decisions Haynes, Boone, and Harris.85 The employees in
procedure as outlined in the CBA. Haynes, 362 F2d at 415. At the conclusion of the proce-
dures, the employer refused to reinstate. Id. In response, however, the final step which
would have required a directive from the union president to strike, was not taken by the
union. Id at 416. The employee sought relief from the Alabama state courts and the em-
ployer removed the suit to the federal district court invoking jurisdiction under § 301 of the
LMRA. Id at 415-16. Boone v Armstrong Cork Co., 384 F2d 285, 291-92 (5th Cir 1967),
Harris v Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc,, 437 F2d 167, 172 (5th Cir 1971), and Hart v
National Homes Corp., 668 F2d 791, 793-94 (5th Cir 1982), followed. All were wrongful
discharge suits brought by employees in which the Fifth Circuit followed Haynes by noting
that judicial review was available to an employee only if the union had breached its duty of
fair representation or if the employer refused to comply with the CBA grievance procedures.
Haynes, 362 F2d at 418. "Final" disposition in accordance with the CBA could not be chal-
lenged on its merits. Id.
80. Haynes, 362 F2d at 417. The employee ified a motion for rehearing which was
denied on the authority of Republic Steel Corp., which had been decided in the interim. Id
at 415. See also notes 72 and 73.
81. Humphrey, 375 US 335 (1964). See note 70 and accompanying text.
82. 295 F2d 658 (6th Cir 1961). Here the dispute involved the discharge of Hildreth.
Union News Co., 295 F2d at 659. The union, in negotiations with the employer, agreed that
the employee was terminated for "just cause" as provided in the CBA. Id at 661. Admitting
the lack of precedent, the court reversed the district court's judgment on behalf of the em-
ployee and concluded that the union was the authoritative bargaining agent for the em-
ployee; therefore, an employer who bargains in good faith should be entitled to rely on the
union's representations. Id at 667. Otherwise, the entire collective-bargaining process is of
"doubtful worth." Id.
83. Id.
84. 684 F2d 374 (6th Cir 1982).
85. Fortune, 684 F2d at 375. See also note 79.
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Fortune did not allege misrepresentation by the union in process-
ing their wrongful discharge disputes.8 6 At the conclusion of the
four-step grievance procedure, the union and employer were dead-
locked on the issue of reinstatement. At that point, the union de-
clined to exercise its right to strike under the CBA.8 7 The CBA in
Fortune provided no method to arbitrate a deadlocked dispute; the
only course bargained for by the union was the right to strike. In
so noting, the court denied the employees a judicial review of their
discharges, reasoning that federal courts were not authorized by
section 301 to reform a CBA on behalf of a dissatisfied party.,
Of the opposing view, the law in the Tenth Circuit was estab-
lished in 1967 by United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
Am. v Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. 9 In Hensel Phelps Constr. Co.,
the court promoted section 301 claims as an option to labor and
management when negotiated CBA grievance procedures failed to
resolve a dispute.90 Citing Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. and Lu-
cas Flour Co., the court held that seeking a judicial determination
in the event the CBA does not provide for binding arbitration was
not only a proper course, but consistent with the federal policy
favoring arbitration.91
In 1968, in Ford v General Elec. Co.,92 the Seventh Circuit ques-
tioned whether the Haynes decision was consistent with congres-
sional policy "since it either leaves the settlement of disputed con-
tract rights to a test of economic strength, or makes a strike the
price of an opportunity for impartial adjudication of the dis-
pute. ' '9 3 Five years later, in Associated Gen. Contractors of Ill. v
Illinois Conference of Teamsters,94 the Seventh Circuit answered
by asserting that enforcing a negotiated arbitration clause was
clearly distinguishable from interpreting a right-to-strike provision
as an agreement to forfeit any rights to the peaceful adjudication
86. Fortune, 684 F2d at 375.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 376 F2d 731 (10th Cir 1967). Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. involved a dispute re-
garding alleged misapplication of differing wage scales attached to various classes of work.
Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 376 F2d at 733.
90. Id at 737.
91. Id. See note 67 and accompanying text.
92. 395 F2d 157 (7th Cir 1968).
93. Ford, 395 F2d at 159. After inquiring "aloud," the court declined to answer, as
the issues in Ford provided for resolution within the CBA. Id.
94. 486 F2d 972 (7th Cir 1973). Like Ford, the dispute in Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors of Ill. arose over the wage scale applicable to certain work performed under the CBA.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Ill., 486 F2d at 973.
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of disputes.9" In the absence of express language to the contrary,
the court refused to construe a CBA reserving the parties' rights to
"economic warfare" as the exclusive or "desirable" method of set-
tling deadlocked disputes.9 6 Continuity prevailed until 1985 when,
in Huffman v Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,97 the Seventh Circuit
seemingly reevaluated its previous criticism of Haynes.9 Huffman
and similarly situated employees were denied judicial review under
section 301 pursuant to a traditional Haynes argument,99 which in-
cluded the prerequisites of exhaustion of grievance procedures and
union misrepresentation, as well as the inability of the federal
courts under section 301 to judge labor disputes on their merits. 100
In 1987, the Ninth Circuit was heard on the issue of whether
parties to a CBA intended the grievance procedures to be final. In
Dickeson v DAW Forest Prods. Co.,10 1 the court cited Associated
Gen. Contractors of Ill. and S. J. Groves & Sons and following
suit, refused to conclude, without express language in the CBA,
that the union's exclusive remedy for dispute resolution was to
strike. 02 Mirroring the pre-Huffman reasoning of the Seventh Cir-
cuit, "economic warfare" was once again criticized as a method for
resolving differences. Dickeson was allowed access to the federal
95. Id at 976.
96. Id. Here, the Seventh Circuit challenged the policy interpretations of § 203(d) of
the LMRA which declares "[flinal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties...
to be the desirable method." LMRA § 203(d), 61 Stat 154 (1947), codified at 29 USC §
173(d) (1947) (emphasis added). See note 58 and accompanying text. Associated Gen. Con-
tractors of Ill., 486 F2d at 976.
97. 752 F2d 1221 (7th Cir 1985).
98. Huffman, 752 F2d at 1225. Prior to Huffman, in 1978, the court cited and ruled
consistently with Associated Gen. Contractors of Ill., in S. J. Groves & Sons Co. v Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, 581 F2d 1241, 1243 (7th Cir 1978).
99. Huffman, 752 F2d at 1225.
100. Id at 1224-26. Although the court did not overrule its prior decisions in Associ-
ated Gen. Contractors of Ill. and S. J. Groves & Sons Co., the distinguishing factors were, in
this author's opinion, finite. Far more similarities than differences were present in the facts.
The dispute in Huffman also involved job classifications and related wage rates. Id at 1222.
Again, when grievance procedures were exhausted without resolution, the union could not
invoke arbitration but chose not to strike. Id at 1223. In distinguishing Huffman the court
focused on a "finality provision" of the CBA, which was exercised when the union did not
respond to the employer's denial of the grievance with notice of their intention to strike. Id
at 1224. This provision for "final" resolution barred the employee action under § 301. Id at
1226.
101. 827 F2d 627 (9th Cir 1987). The CBA in Dickeson provided for a four-level griev-
ance procedure that culminated in a hearing before union and employer representatives.
Dickeson, 827 F2d at 629. The union had the right to strike if the results of the final hearing
were deemed unsatisfactory. Id. The dispute was alleged wrongful discharge. Id at 628.
102. Id at 629.
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courts under section 301 of the LMRA. 10 3
The Supreme Court has attempted to settle the obvious, but un-
derstandable confusion among the circuits with a unanimous opin-
ion in Groves v Ring Screw Works.104 The Court, charged with the
interpretation of federal labor policy, has been hard pressed to rec-
oncile the practical needs of an economically volatile labor-man-
agement relationship with the judicial responsibilities of establish-
ing a consistent framework of decisions. In Textile Workers Union
of Am., the Court firmly and expansively established the jurisdic-
tional purview of the federal courts to enforce CBAs under section
301 of the LMRA.10 5 In so doing, the Court heavily credited the
negotiating process between union and employer and established
the presumption of "quid pro quo" bargaining for the right to
strike.10 6 In contrast, opinions since Textile Workers Union of
Am., with the exception of Smith v Evening News Ass'n,10 7 have
sought to mitigate judicial interference by prohibiting a review of
the merits of the dispute, requiring the exhaustion of contracted
grievance procedures, and upholding the good faith representation
of the collective bargaining agent. Throughout, the Court has
firmly enforced grievance procedures requiring arbitration, can-
didly celebrating peaceful recourse to labor disputes as prescribed
by federal labor policy.
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have focused on the Court's trend
of judicial restraint. Undeniably the Court has frequently been in
strong voice regarding the impropriety of judicial evaluation of the
merits of a dispute, enforceability of an award, or equity of the
CBA itself. Such opinions found statutory basis in section 203(d)
of the LMRA, 10 8 the legislated preference for dispute resolution
was to be found in the CBA and judicial review was to be limited
to the extent of the contract negotiated by the parties. A difference
of opinion was not grounds for judicial intervention.
The Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits agree that, assuming fair
representation, exhaustion of negotiated grievance procedures is a
prerequisite to judicial review. However, mindful of the many deci-
103. Id at 629-30.
104. 111 S Ct 498 (1990).
105. Textile Workers Union of Am., 353 US at 455-56. See notes 52-54.
106. Textile Workers Union of Am., 353 US at 455. See note 59.
107. 371 US 195 (1962). Smith extended judicial audience under the LMRA to indi-
vidual claimants. See note 69 and accompanying text.
108. LMRA § 203(d), 61 Stat 154 (1947), codified at 29 USC § 173(d) (1947). See also
notes 58, 73 and 96.
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sions extolling the virtues of arbitration'09 and cognizant of the
regularly cited legislative motives towards commercial harmony,
these circuits have been justifiably reluctant to enforce "economic
warfare" as an appropriate means of dispute resolution. Whether it
was "desirable" to effect a CBA, which contrary to federal labor
policy did not offer a peaceful means of dispute resolution, was the
heart of the controversy in Groves.
The long-standing "quid pro quo" presumption was shattered by
the impact of Groves. Without reservation for effect on court dock-
ets, the decision opened the door to judicial review unless the CBA
expressly precluded such an action.110 Recognizing the dilemma of
the individual claimant with a valid grievance for whom the CBA
does not provide a method for peaceful settlement, the judiciary
was availed to obtain equitable resolution to offset any imbalance
in the comparative strength of the parties."" Uncharacteristically,
the Court concerned itself with the merits of the dispute." 2 In
Groves, "desirable" under the federal labor law was construed to
mean peaceful method of settlement; if not provided or prohibited
by the CBA, then provided by the courts.
The message sent by the unanimous decision in Groves is aimed
at fine-tuning a CBA. The courts will not infer forfeiture of judicial
remedy and will not favor economic recourse, such as a strike or
lockout, as an implied exclusive means of resolving a labor dispute.
Clearly, peaceful methods of dispute resolution are preferred by
the Court. In order to balance the rights of parties to freely con-
tract, with the public policy against forceful dispute resolution, the
Court refrained, however, from holding that the parties' right to
judicial remedy under the LMRA could not be expressly negoti-
ated away.
Although placing the responsibility of concise drafting on the ne-
gotiating parties is consistent with legislative intent, the success or
failure of Groves in promoting harmony between labor and man-
agement will, as always, depend on the parties' willingness to
109. It is interesting to note that the circuits, in substantiating their opposing views,
both find a basis of authority in the "Steelworkers Trilogy." The confusion over what these
decisions mean, and whether peaceful dispute resolution and autonomous collective bargain-
ing are in reality mutually exclusive terms, are also addressed in William B. Gould IV, Judi-
cial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards - Thirty Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The
Aftermath of AT&T and MISCO, 64 Notre Dame L Rev 464, 467 (1989).
110. Groves, 111 S Ct at 503.
111. Id.
112. Id at 502. Also see note 34 and accompanying text.
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adopt the "friendly"' 13 philosophy purported by the LMRA. The
obvious difficulty lies in the essence of negotiations, which are in-
herently governed by the relative strength of the parties at the
bargaining table. Educating representatives as to the pitfalls of an
agreement, absent a clause for binding arbitration, will not change
the adversarial nature of the negotiating process or relieve the eco-
nomically disruptive hostility that inequity in bargaining power
breeds.
This is not to say that Groves will not impact the negotiating
process. Although the "Steelworkers Trilogy"' 14 and their progeny
were not expressly overruled, the Court in Groves flirts danger-
ously with an evaluation of the merits of the labor dispute. In an
effort to force equity into the bargaining process, Groves has made
the courts labor arbitrators. The distinction between the role of
the arbitrator and the role of the judiciary has been blurred, par-
ticularly with regard to wrongful discharge suits brought by indi-
vidual employees. For example, less than a month later, citing
Groves as precedent, the Supreme Court reversed an Ohio court of
appeals decision upholding the dismissal of a wrongful discharge
suit in Ledsome v U-Brand Corp.1
5
In Ledsome, the negotiated grievance procedures did not result
in resolution of the dispute." 6 The trial court dismissed the com-
plaint stating that, without establishing breach of fair representa-
tion by his union, Ledsome had no cause of action because the ne-
gotiated grievance procedures were presumptively the final and
exclusive means of dispute resolution unless the CBA expressly
stated otherwise." 7 The dismissal was vacated" 8 and upon re-
mand, the courts will also decide whether Ledsome was wrongfully
discharged. If, in the wake of Groves, the merits of labor disputes
113. See note 45 and accompanying text.
114. See notes 55 through 64 and accompanying text discussing American Mfg. Co.,
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. and Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.
115. 111 S Ct 663 (1991).
116. Ledsome v U-Brand Corp., 1989 Ohio App LEXIS 2727; 134 Labor Rel Ref Man
3061 (1989). The employee in Ledsome was discharged for alleged possession and abuse of
marijuana and alcohol on company property. Id. The CBA provided for a four-step griev-
ance procedure which culminated in binding arbitration at the election of both parties. Id.
Within its rights under the procedures, management refused to submit the grievance to
arbitration. Id. Thereafter, Ledsome filed a breach of CBA action claiming wrongful dis-
charge in the Court of Common Pleas, Ashland County, Ohio. Id. In affirming the lower
court's dismissal, the Court of Appeals of Ohio cited Fortune. Id. See notes 84 through 88
and accompanying text for a discussion of Fortune.
117. Ledsome, 1989 Ohio App LEXIS 2727; 134 Labor Rel Ref Man 3061 (1989).
118. Ledsome, 111 S Ct 663.
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will ultimately be measured by the courts, labor and management
may perceive relief from their responsibilities as negotiators. In ad-
dition, too ready an access to the courts may undermine the collec-
tive bargaining process with constant challenges of enforceability.
Such a result the legislators of the Taft-Hartley Act did not
envision.
It is the opinion of this author that Groves will require judicial
or legislative refinement because of the potential abuses of adjudi-
cating labor disputes on the merits. Such judicial dilution of the
parties' right to freely contract will foster economic evils commen-
surate with those the enforcement powers of the LMRA were en-
acted to combat. In the continuing struggles to identify the elusive
balancing point between labor and management, the courts will
find little relief from a public policy that has proven powerless to
inject into negotiations an attitude that the parties are unable, or
unwilling, to contemplate in the pursuit of their individual eco-
nomic objectives at the bargaining table.
Deborrah Kaczmarek Beck
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